We use a natural experiment, the Supreme Court Ruling in Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the subsequent Dodd-Frank Act, to examine whether and how expected private litigation costs affect voluntary disclosure behavior. The Morrison decision applied a presumption against extraterritoriality for all securities actions. Congress quickly responded by exempting SEC actions through the Dodd-Frank Act, with the result that Morrison eliminates only private securities actions for shares purchased on non-US exchanges. These events lowered the expected private litigation costs for foreign firms cross-listed on US exchanges. We find a deterioration in our proxies for voluntary disclosure for these firms relative to a matched sample of US firms. The effects we document are stronger for firms with weaker home country institutions and for firms that experienced a larger decline in expected private litigation costs following Morrison. The evidence is consistent with firms responding to a reduction in expected private litigation costs by reducing voluntary disclosure.
Introduction
We examine the causal effect of expected private litigation costs on voluntary disclosure using a unique natural experiment, the Supreme Court ruling in Morrison v National Australia Bank 1 (hereafter referred to as Morrison). This unexpected ruling reduced expected private litigation costs by eliminating the right of shareholders who purchased shares of foreign companies on a foreign exchange to pursue shareholder lawsuits in US courts under Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act. 2 Morrison was unexpected because it contradicted more than 40 years of legal precedent that allowed such shareholders to pursue claims in US courts. In addition, Morrison allows us to isolate the effect of expected private litigation costs on voluntary disclosure because of provisions in the subsequent Dodd-Frank Act, which ensured that there was no impact on the public enforcement capabilities of the SEC.
The relation between expected private litigation costs and voluntary disclosure is unclear in the literature for two reasons. First, prior studies have relied on comparisons between firms from different legal environments or examined the disclosure choices of firms that are actually subject to lawsuits. The results from these studies are difficult to interpret since firms in these settings could endogenously adjust their disclosure to reduce expected litigation costs. Second, the relation between expected private litigation costs and voluntary disclosure is shaped by two competing economic forces. On the one hand, a reduction in expected private litigation cost may 1 The full text of the Morrison case is available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1191.pdf 2 Morrison reduced expected litigation costs by both reducing potential recoveries (conditional on a settlement) and reducing the likelihood of a suit being filed. The reduction in recoveries occurs because shareholders who acquire shares outside the US are no longer entitled to compensation. This can lead to a significant reduction in settlement costs. For example, for the 2003 suit against Royal Ahold which was settled for $1 billion in 2006, only 2.4 per cent of trading during the class period was in the US. The reduction in the likelihood of a suit occurs because, in addition to lower expected recoveries, federal courts may no longer have jurisdiction. For example, in Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., a US Pension fund filed an action under 10(b) against a Swiss Corporation alleging that the corporation and two of its senior officers misled investors about the company's business fundamentals. The claim was dismissed under Morrison because the Swiss Reinsurance Co shares were purchased on a foreign exchange (Council of Institutional Investors, 2012) . 1 lead to a decrease in disclosure by mitigating lawsuits related to insufficient disclosure. On the other hand, a reduction in expected private litigation cost may lead to an increase in disclosure by mitigating lawsuits related to (implicit) forecasts that do not materialize. These conflicting forces highlight the importance of an exogenous setting to deriving any conclusions about the association between litigation risk and voluntary disclosure.
We take advantage of the exogenous shock to expected private litigation costs attributable to Morrison to provide clean insight into the relation between private litigation and voluntary disclosure. We use two empirical strategies to identify this relation. First, we compare foreign cross-listed firms (who were affected by Morrison) with a matched sample of US firms (who were not affected by Morrison). Second, we take advantage of the fact that foreign crosslisted firms experienced differential effects based on country-level attributes (e.g., the country's legal institutions) and firm-level attributes (e.g., the change in the firm's expected private litigation costs). These factors allow us to compare the relative change in disclosure behavior of the cross-listed firms that are most affected by Morrison to those that are least affected.
We use the likelihood and frequency of management guidance as direct tests of voluntary disclosure behavior and properties of analyst forecasts as indirect tests of voluntary disclosure behavior (similar to Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009 ). We find that there was a reduction in both the likelihood of management guidance as well as the frequency of guidance for foreign crosslisted firms relative to US firms following Morrison. We also find that there was a reduction in analyst coverage for foreign cross-listed firms relative to US firms following Morrison. These results indicate that firms responded to the reduction in expected private litigation costs by reducing voluntary disclosure. 2 We further examine the effect of private securities litigation on voluntary disclosure by conducting cross-sectional tests using a series of country-level institutional variables. We conduct these tests because Morrison transfers private litigation rights of a firm's shareholders who purchased shares outside the US from the US regulatory system to the home country's regulatory system. Therefore, to the extent that the foreign cross-listed firm resides in a country with a weak regulatory structure, there should be a larger impact associated with Morrison. Our results are consistent with this expectation. For each country-level measure, we find that several of our disclosure proxies experience larger changes when the foreign cross-listed firm is from a country with weak institutions.
We then conduct additional cross-sectional tests using variables that capture the impact of
Morrison on the firm's expected private litigation costs. More specifically, we use the volume of shares traded on foreign exchanges relative to US exchanges. Since Morrison eliminated the ability of shareholders who purchase shares on non-US exchanges to seek compensation in US courts, this variable captures the proportional reduction in expected private litigation costs conditional on a settlement. In addition, we use an alternate approach that is the product of this conditional reduction in cost and the ex-ante likelihood of a lawsuit (using the litigation risk model in Kim and Skinner (2012) ) to capture the overall reduction in expected private litigation cost. Under both approaches, our results are again consistent with the conclusion that firms reduced voluntary disclosure in response to a reduction in private litigation costs. Firms with more trading on non-US exchanges experienced the largest reductions in expected private litigation costs as a result of Morrison, and these firms responded by curtailing voluntary disclosure to a greater extent. 3 Overall, the findings from our country and firm level cross-sectional tests support the hypothesis that the effects of the Morrison ruling on voluntary disclosure behavior are the strongest for firms where the ruling should have the greatest impact. While a number of tests are statistically insignificant and thus inconclusive, all significant coefficients support the conclusion that a reduction in expected private litigation costs leads to a deterioration in voluntary disclosure. In addition, we obtain similar results when we match firms based on the level of voluntary disclosure in the pre-period, when we separately analyze Canadian and non-Canadian firms, and when we consider short-window market based measures of a firm's information environment. In addition, our results do not seem to be driven by other concurrent events, and in particular, the Dodd-Frank Act. Therefore, we have a reasonable degree of confidence in the overall results even if several individual tests are inconclusive.
We make several contributions to the literature. Our primary contribution is to the literature on the relation between private securities litigation and voluntary disclosure. Morrison allows us to cleanly identify the causal effect of private securities litigation on disclosure behavior. The exogenous shock to the litigation environment not only provides an ideal setting to study the causal relation between litigation and disclosure, but it also keeps public enforcement constant allowing us to focus specifically on private litigation. We find that firms responded to the reduction in expected private litigation costs by reducing their voluntary disclosure.
Our findings also contribute to the literature on the costs and benefits of cross-listing.
Extant research documents that cross-listed firms have better information environments, which are associated with higher market valuations (Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003; Doidge, 2004; Stulz, 2004, 2009) . The sources of these benefits have been largely attributed to the firm's voluntary bonding to a more stringent reporting regime (Coffee, 2002) . In 4 addition, recent work by Cheng, Srinavasan, and Yu (2013) and Gande and Miller (2012) finds that private securities litigation against cross-listed firms in US courts is relatively common, which suggests that private litigation in US courts provides an important enforcement role that supports the bonding mechanism. Our evidence adds to this literature by showing that two aspects of the bonding mechanism (i.e. disclosure regime and enforcement) are related, and in particular that the private securities litigation rights of a firm's shareholders affects a cross-listed firm's voluntary disclosure behavior.
We also add to the literature on Morrison by identifying a specific firm response to the ruling. The literature on Morrison has focused exclusively on the stock market response. For example, Licht, Li, and Siegel (2012) investigate the overall wealth effects of private securities litigation using a short window stock market event study. They find inconsistent results, and conclude that private securities litigation does not increase firm value. Gagnon and Karolyi (2012) investigate the stock market response of the US listed relative to the non-US listed shares of the same firm. They find a positive relative effect, which they suggest is because investors who acquired US listed shares can still collect damages through litigation, but only bear a portion of the overall litigation costs, which fall on the firm as a whole. Neither of these studies examines the firm's response to Morrison, and in particular, whether and how Morrison influences the firm's voluntary disclosure behavior.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the legal setting that we exploit as a natural experiment. We then outline the existing literature and present our hypotheses in Section 3. We present our data collection in Section 4, followed by our research design in Section 5. The results are presented in Section 6 and Section 7, and we conclude in Section 8. 
Institutional Setting
The Morrison decision provides an ideal setting to study the effects of private litigation on voluntary disclosure because expected private litigation costs were unexpectedly and materially altered for certain types of foreign firms. This section discusses the regulatory landscape for shareholder lawsuits under Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act to establish that Morrison was unexpected and material, and to identify how it affected expected private litigation costs for certain firms. We will rely on this discussion for our empirical strategy, which is outlined in Section 4 and 5.
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 give shareholders the right to recover damages from the firm for any act or omission resulting in fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of the firm's shares. Prior to Morrison, the Court of Appeals had established two tests for applying Section 10(b) to cases with foreign elements: the "effects test" and the "conduct test." Under the effects test, Section 10(b) applied to fraudulent conduct that directly affected US investors or markets. In practice, the effects test was satisfied when either the securities were traded on a US exchange or the securities were purchased by a US investor. Under the conduct test, Section 10(b) applied to fraudulent conduct in the US that caused losses abroad, even if those losses were incurred by foreign investors. As a result, it was possible for a foreign issuer to be sued in US courts by foreign plaintiffs who bought their securities on a foreign exchange-what was popularly referred to as an "F-cubed" securities class action. In such cases, the conduct test was typically satisfied if the fraudulent conduct occurred in the US.
The applicability of the effects and conduct tests are summarized in Panel A of Figure 1 .
The two-by-two matrix identifies the applicable test for a foreign issuer based on the location of the exchange and the nationality of investor. 107 included F-cubed investors in the initial class, and there were 41 cases where the court decided on F-cubed subject matter jurisdiction. In 27 of these 41 cases (66%), courts found that subject matter jurisdiction existed over F-cubed investors' trades (Buckberg and Gulker, 2011) .
The Morrison case considered by the Supreme Court was an F-cubed securities class action. Australian investors who purchased shares on a foreign exchange sued National Australia
Bank ("NAB"), a foreign issuer. The specific fraudulent act involved the overstatement of the servicing rights asset of a Florida-based NAB subsidiary which was in the business of servicing mortgages. The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no subject matter jurisdiction using the conduct test, because the act of overstating the value of the servicing rights asset was undertaken by executives located in Australia. The fact that the specific asset that was overstated was located in the US was insufficient to create jurisdiction. The court concluded that any actions in the US were, at most, a link in a securities fraud that was conducted abroad.
The Supreme Court affirmed, but in so doing, ruled that the main fraud-related provisions of US securities laws apply only to transactions in securities that take place in the United States or to transactions in securities listed on a US securities exchange. While the decision to find a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was not surprising, the application of a presumption against extraterritoriality was completely unexpected as it reversed more than 40 years of established legal precedent. In contrast to most of this prior work, we focus on foreign firms that are cross-listed in the US. Recent work by Cheng, Srinavasan, and Yu (2013) and Gande and Miller (2012) finds that private securities litigation against cross-listed firms in US courts, while not as common as that against US firms, is also relatively common. In addition, the damages that arise under these shareholder suits can be significant. Moreover, the allocation of damages to non-US investors can represent a large proportion of the overall settlement. The effect of a decline in expected private litigation costs likely differs across firms based on both country-level and firm-level attributes. Morrison transfers private litigation rights of a firm's shareholders who purchased shares outside the US from the US regulatory system to the home country's regulatory system. Therefore, to the extent that the cross-listed firm resides in a country with a weak regulatory structure, there should be a stronger impact associated with
Morrison. This leads to our second hypothesis, which we state in the alternative:
H2: The change in voluntary disclosure behavior following Morrison is stronger for foreign cross-listed firms with weaker home country institutions.
Firms may also respond differently to Morrison based on the firm specific measure of the change in expected private litigation costs due to Morrison. In particular, firms that have a greater proportion of shares traded outside the US and firms with a higher ex ante litigation risk should experience larger changes in expected private litigation costs. Therefore, if the drop in expected private litigation costs reduces voluntary disclosure, we would expect the reduction to be greatest for firms with the greatest decline in expected private litigation costs. In contrast, if 11 the drop in expected private litigation costs increases voluntary disclosure, we would expect the increase to be greatest for firms with greatest decline in expected private litigation costs. We therefore state our third hypothesis in the alternative:
H3: The change in voluntary disclosure behavior following Morrison is stronger for
foreign cross-listed firms with a greater decline in expected private litigation costs.
Data and Sample
This section proceeds as follows. First, we explain our choice of event window. We then summarize the data collection for the treatment firms (i.e. those firms affected by Morrison) and then the control firms (i.e. those firms not affected by Morrison).
Event Window
The event window is summarized in Figure 2 . We use equal-length two year periods published and the Dodd-Frank Act is adopted, the latter of which occurred on July 21, 2010. We use calendar year periods for both the pre-and post-periods to ensure that our data is comparable over time.
Selection of Treatment Firms
The Morrison ruling affects shareholders of foreign firms with shares traded on a non-US exchange. For these firms, shareholders who purchase shares outside the US can no longer use 12 US courts to initiate shareholder actions. Following prior research on Morrison (Gagnon et al., 2012; Licht et al., 2012) , we select as our treatment firms the subset of foreign firms that are cross-listed in the US, and thus have shares that trade both on a US and non-US exchange. We categorize a firm as foreign if it is incorporated and headquartered outside the US based on information collected from Compustat. 4 In addition, we exclude financial firms as the DoddFrank Act, which was passed shortly after Morrison, resulted in a significant change in the regulatory framework for financial institutions.
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For each firm, we obtain financial and stock return data from Compustat and CRSP, and analyst forecast and management guidance from I/B/E/S. We exclude firms with insufficient data for our tests. In addition, we collect information on the US dollar equivalent trading volume on US and non-US exchanges on which the firm is traded using Bloomberg terminal. We exclude firms whose proportion of trading volume on US exchanges exceeds 98 percent from the treatment group because for those firms Morrison only affects a very small fraction of the firm's shareholders. Finally, we balance our dataset by requiring that the foreign cross-listed firms have at least one observation in both the pre-and post-Morrison period. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the treatment firms. There are 453 unique firms and 1,548 firm-year observations from 37 countries. Canadian firms comprise the largest proportion, with about one-third of the firms headquartered in Canada, followed by Israel, the 4 It is technically possible for a firm that is incorporated and headquartered overseas to not qualify as a private foreign issuer, and hence be subject to the same regulatory regime as US listed firms. The SEC's definition of foreign private issuer, which is provided in Exchange Act Rule 3b-3, excludes firms that are technically foreign (i.e. incorporated outside the US) but are essentially American (i.e. majority of voting rights are held by US investors AND either the majority of top management is American, the majority of assets are held in the US, or the business is managed in the US). To the extent that any such firms are included in our sample of treatment firms, it would bias against finding any results since these firms would not be affected by Morrison. 5 We also conduct robustness tests to provide assurance that the results we document are not because the foreign and US firms in our sample were differentially affected by other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. These tests are described in Section 7.
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United Kingdom, and Brazil. Table 1 also presents the country institutional variables we use in the cross-sectional analyses.
Selection of Control Firms
The control firms in our setting are US firms that are not affected by Morrison. An alternative control group would be to use foreign firms that are not cross-listed. We do not use these foreign non-cross-listed firms for two reasons. First, foreign non-cross-listed firms may have been impacted by Morrison. This is because the pre-Morrison rules permitted suits against foreign firms that had operations in the US under the conduct test, regardless of whether the firm was cross-listed or not. In addition, even if the foreign firm did not have operations, it was still possible to file a claim under the effects test if the plaintiffs were US investors. Second, the predictions associated with tests that use foreign non-cross-listed firms as controls are ambiguous because the relative decline in litigation risk for foreign non-cross-listed firms could be greater or less than the decline for foreign cross-listed firms. Foreign non-cross-listed firms likely had lower expected private litigation costs when compared with foreign cross-listed firms prior to
Morrison. Therefore, the overall decline in expected private litigation costs for the foreign noncross-listed firms should be lower. However, the proportional reduction is greater for these firms since their exposure to US private securities litigation is likely eliminated entirely following
Morrison.
Foreign non-cross-listed firms that did not have any US operations or US investors would
provide a useful control sample, as these firms did not experience any change in expected private litigation costs due to Morrison. However, these firms would likely be very different than the foreign cross-listed firms in our sample. In addition, there are some more practical concerns.
First, identifying firms without US operations or US investors is not a straight forward task.
14 Second, even if these firms could be identified, we would need to be able to collect information on management guidance and analyst activity to conduct our empirical tests. Currently, management guidance data for foreign firms is only obtainable for a subset of our sample period as that information on Capital IQ is only updated through 2011. 6 Therefore, we use US firms as our control sample.
Rather than including all US firms as control firms in our empirical tests, we generate a matched sample of US firms using a propensity score model. We use a propensity score model in lieu of matching on a small set of specific characteristics, such as firm size and industry classification, because it places less restrictive assumptions on the functional form for the relation between the control variables and the outcome variable (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) .
Typically, propensity score matching is used to allow the researcher to approximate an experimental setting such that causal inferences may be made. In our setting, this would entail identifying a set of firms that were equally likely to be treated (i.e. to be subject to Morrison), but did not receive the treatment. That is not the reason we employ propensity score matching, as our setting provides an exogenous shock that allows us to make casual statements. Rather, we employ propensity score matching because it reduces noise in our estimation that would otherwise be present due to fact that the average cross-listed firm is not easily comparable to the average US firm (Karolyi, 2006 Table 3 provides the propensity score model for the management guidance tests. 7 The propensity score model we use is the same for our analyst tests. However, for that sample we add an additional restriction that each firm has at least one analyst in the pre-period before matching.
This ensures that the pair is not dropped in subsequent analyses if one of two firms had no coverage. We do not make this requirement in the post-period, as doing so would be sampling on the outcome we are trying to document. Table 3 Panel A reveals that the average cross-listed firm is indeed different from the average US firm. It shows that cross-listed firms are generally larger, have greater growth opportunities and lower volatility than the average US firm. The pseudo R 2 is 13% suggesting a reasonable fit. We use this model to match treatment (i.e. foreign cross-listed) and control (i.e. US) firms by pairing firms with the closest propensity score in the same year and industry. We sample the control firms with replacement as this allows for the closest possible match and best control. We cluster standard errors by firm to correct for the possibility that a single control firm may have multiple occurrences. Panel B provides the covariate balance between the matched treatment and control firms for the management guidance tests. Overall, the sample seems well-matched on most dimensions included in the propensity score model. Two of the pairwise differences are statistically significant. To address problems with imperfect covariate balance, we include the matching variables as control variables in our regressions.
Research Design
We analyze the impact of private litigation on voluntary disclosure using the following specification: due to the inclusion of country fixed effects in all our regressions and the fact that foreign trading is zero for US firms. We include the same control variables as with equation (1).
The coefficients of interest in this specification are β 2 and β 4 . The differential change in voluntary disclosure behavior for foreign cross-listed firms with a relatively small change in expected litigation cost relative to US firms is measured by β 2 . The differential change in voluntary disclosure behavior for cross-listed firms with large changes in expected private litigation costs relative to cross-listed firms with small changes in expected private litigation costs is measured by β 4 . Therefore, to the extent that a decline in expected private litigation costs leads to a deterioration in voluntary disclosure behavior, our specification implies that both β 2 < 0 and β 4 < 0. 
Results
The results of equation (1), provided in We further investigate the effect of expected litigation costs on voluntary disclosure using cross-sectional tests involving country-level institutional variables. We examine the differential effects using the specification in equation (2), the results of which are presented in Table 5 .
Within each panel, columns 1-5 present tests using each of our voluntary disclosure proxies from Enforcement interaction term are also consistent with a decline in voluntary disclosure for three of the five measures. There is a relative decrease in management forecast guidance frequency and analyst following, and a relative increase in forecast dispersion, for cross-listed with lower levels of public enforcement.
In Table 6 The coefficient on Post*Foreign*High Litigation Cost is negative and significant for management guidance frequency and analyst following, similar to Panel A. In addition, the triple interaction is now significant for the management guidance variable.
We do not report the results using the Kim and Skinner (2012) measure by itself because it is derived from a prediction model of the total litigation risk for US firms. Therefore, it likely provides a noisy estimate of the impact of Morrison relative to the foreign trading measure.
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Nonetheless, for robustness, we conduct tests using the Kim and Skinner (2012) measure. In untabulated results, we find results that are directionally similar to those in Table 6 , but not statistically significant. Thus, while the ex-ante litigation risk measure contributes to the joint significance of the litigation cost variable, it is not statistically significant by itself.
Overall, the findings from our cross-sectional tests in Table 5 and Table 6 Tables 5 and 6 , thirteen of the coefficients on the cross-sectional interaction terms are in the predicted direction and statistically significant at the 10% level or better. Thus, we have a reasonable degree of confidence in the overall results even if several individual tests are inconclusive.
Robustness Tests

Alternative Matching Procedure
We use an alternative matching approach where we match based on the level of the dependent variable in the pre-period conditional on year and industry. When there are multiple matches, we select the firm with the closest propensity score. We use this alternative approach because even though the foreign cross-listed firms and US firms may be economically similar in our primary analysis, this does not imply that they are similar for each of our measures of voluntary disclosure. This is only an issue to the extent that these differences are not adequately controlled for by the inclusion of the control variables, as well as industry and country fixed 25 effects. For example, if there were one less analyst for each firm domiciled in Germany, this difference would be controlled for by the country fixed effect.
Similar to our primary matching approach, we sample the control firms with replacement as this allows for the closest possible match and best control. We cluster standard errors by firm to correct our standard errors for the possibility that a single control firm may have multiple occurrences. The results presented in Table 7 mirror our base specifications in Table 4 . We find a statistically significant relative deterioration in the likelihood of management guidance, management guidance frequency, and analyst coverage for cross-listed firms relative to US firms. Once again, this is consistent with a decline in voluntary disclosure in response to a reduction in expected private litigation costs.
One potential concern with this alternative matching procedure is that the US firms in the control sample do not follow the disclosure practices of the typical US firm, and therefore any change in disclosure practice over our sample period might also be unusual. For example, when the dependent variable is management guidance, we match the foreign cross-listed firm with a US firm based on whether both firms provide management guidance in the pre-period. Because many foreign firms do not provide management guidance, this means that the control firms are US firms that also do not provide guidance. The issue that this creates is that the US firm may converge to normal US disclosure practices over our sample period, and hence institute management guidance in the post-Morrison period. This would bias our results toward finding that foreign cross-listed firms reduce voluntary disclosure when compared with the control firms.
This potential bias is evident by looking at the coefficient on Post in Table 7 . This coefficient implies that there is a 30 percentage point increase in US firms that provide management 26 guidance between the pre and post periods. This is much higher than in our primary tests and does not seem plausible.
Sample Selection
We split our sample into two groups-Canadian and non-Canadian firms. We do this because Canadian firms make up approximately one-third of the sample of foreign cross-listed firms, and we want to ensure that the results are attributable to foreign firms generally, and not just to Canadian firms. The results presented in Table 8 
Alternative Proxies for Voluntary Disclosure
We conduct a series of alternative proxies for voluntary disclosure. First, we consider market based measures of a firm's information environment which provide indirect measures of disclosure behavior. Following Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009), we use absolute size adjusted returns, measured over the three day window surrounding earnings announcements. To the extent that firms reduce voluntary disclosure throughout the year, we expect that the proportion of new information provided during earnings announcements will increase, and therefore that there will be a higher absolute price reaction. Following a similar logic we also examine share turnover and bid-ask spreads around the earnings announcement. Table 9 presents the results for these market-27 based measures. We find statistically significant results for the price and volume specifications, but not the spread specification. These results provide some additional support for the conclusion that there is a positive association between private litigation risk and voluntary disclosure.
Second, we consider finer definitions of management forecasts. In particular, we create three management guidance variables that reflect the percentage of management forecasts that are annual, point, and short-term forecasts, respectively. A short-term forecast is a forecast that pertains to the current quarter (Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson, 2001) . In untabulated results, we find results that are directionally consistent, but not significant at conventional levels.
Third, we perform tests to capture the differential response of bad versus good news.
Because we find that voluntary disclosure is reduced in response to a reduction in private litigation risk, we expect that the voluntary disclosure of bad news will be reduced more following Morrison (Skinner, 1994 We also investigate whether timely loss recognition changes differentially for those firms subject to a reduction in expected private litigation costs. Because we find a reduction in voluntary disclosure in response to Morrison, we predict that firms affected by Morrison are likely to experience a reduction in timely loss recognition. We use two measures of timely loss recognition, both of which are taken from Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) . The results for each specification are not significant at conventional levels and therefore inconclusive.
Concurrent Events
We investigate whether our results could be attributable to concurrent events. In particular, our event window coincided with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. To the extent that this legislation changed the disclosure requirements for US firms relative foreign cross-listed firms, our results could be attributable to Dodd-Frank rather than Morrison. As noted in Section 4, our analysis excludes financial firms, who were the primary targets of the reforms contained in Dodd-Frank. However, it is still possible that other provisions of Dodd-Frank may affect our results.
Our investigation did not uncover any financial statement disclosure provisions included in the Dodd-Frank that applied differentially to US versus foreign cross-listed firms. For example, new disclosure rules relating to conflict minerals were adopted for mining and natural 29 resource companies. 8 However, those rules applied to both US and foreign issuers. 9 In addition, Dodd-Frank included several provisions related to executive compensation. Some of these provisions, such as the "say-on-pay" advisory vote requirement, are applicable to proxy statements issued in advance of annual meetings. Because foreign issuers are typically exempt from SEC proxy rules, this could lead to differences in proxy requirements for foreign issuers relative to US firms following the implementation of Dodd-Frank.
We do not expect that differences in proxy rules could explain changes in voluntary disclosure. Nonetheless, to see if this difference could partially explain our results, we replicate our results using a subsample of 195 foreign cross-listed firms that are subject to the proxy rule changes by virtue of their listing on the NYSE. This occurs because NYSE-listed companies are required to solicit proxies for all meetings of shareholders, with limited exceptions. 10 We find a positive relation between voluntary disclosure and expected litigation costs for this subsample, consistent with our full sample results. This supports our expectation that the effect we document is not due to differences in proxy rules across US and foreign cross-listed firms.
Conclusion
We use a natural experiment to examine whether and how expected private litigation costs affect voluntary disclosure behavior. The Morrison ruling unexpectedly and substantially reduced the expected litigation costs of foreign cross-listed firms. We find that these firms respond to an exogenous decrease in expected private litigation costs by reducing voluntary 8 The final rules adopted by the SEC to implement these sections of Dodd-Frank can be viewed at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml. 9 There are 79 firms in our sample that are part of the mining and natural resource industry. Excluding these firms from our analysis does not change any of the results. 10 See NYSE Exchange Rule 402.04 for more details.
30 disclosure relative to a control sample of matched US firms. We document a reduction in both the likelihood of management guidance as well as the frequency of guidance for foreign crosslisted firms relative to US firms. We also find a reduction in analyst coverage and, in some tests, an increase in forecast dispersion for foreign cross-listed firms relative to US firms. Our interpretation of the data is supported by cross sectional tests, which show that firms with weak home country institutions and cross-listed firms with greater reductions in expected private The foreign cross-listed firm sample comprises a maximum of 453 unique firms and 1,548 firm-year observations from 37 countries, for which we have sufficient data to estimate our propensity score model (see Table 3 ). We classify a firm as foreign cross-listed if it is incorporated and headquartered outside of the US and is listed on an US exchange. We eliminate firms with over 98 percent of the trading volume on the US exchanges. We require the foreign cross-listed firms to have at least one observation pre and post Morrison. The table also lists the institutional variables we use in the cross-sectional analyses: (1) We distinguish between countries of code law Legal Origin (= '1') and countries of common law legal origin (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998) . (2) (3) Analyst Following is the monthly number of analysts providing an EPS forecast averaged over the fiscal year. (4) Forecast Accuracy is defined as the monthly absolute difference between the consensus EPS forecast and actual EPS averaged over the fiscal year, scaled by end of fiscal year stock price. We multiply by negative one such that larger values represent more accurate forecast. (5) Forecast Dispersion is the monthly standard deviation of analyst EPS forecasts averaged over the fiscal year, scaled by end of fiscal year stock price. We use the following variables in the propensity score matching model: (1) Total Assets are denominated in US$ millions. (2) Book-to-Market is the ratio of book value of equity divided by market value of equity. (3) Earnings Surprise is the absolute change in earnings before extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets. (4) Return Variability is the annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a firm's fiscal year. (5) Stock Return is the annual buy-and-hold return including dividends for the fiscal year. (6) Return on Assets is the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. We control for GDP Growth defined as the two-year growth rate over the contemporaneous period in all our regression analyses. We use two additional variables for our cross-sectional predictions: (1) Foreign Trading equals the proportion of trading volume outside of the US. For US firms, this variable is set to zero. (2) Litigation Cost is measured based on the model in Kim and Skinner (2012) , normalized between zero and one, and multiplied by Foreign Trading. Accounting data and market values are measured as of the fiscal year end. Except for variables with natural lower or upper bounds, we winsorize all variables at the first and 99 th percentile, and we use the natural log of the raw values where indicated. The table reports the propensity score matching procedures for the management guidance sample; results for the analyst forecast samples are largely similar. Panel A presents logit coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) zstatistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. Foreign is an indicator variable set to '1' for the sample of foreign firms. For details of the remaining variables see Table 2 . Panel B presents the test statistics of covariate distributions for the foreign and matched US firms. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). Foreign is an indicator variable set to '1' for the sample of foreign firms. All other variables are defined in Table 2 . We include industry-and country-fixed effects in the regression, but do not report the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). Table 2 . We report OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. We include industry-and country-fixed effects in the regression, but do not report the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). The table reports additional sensitivity analyses of our base specifications (see Table 4 ) examining changes in firms' voluntary disclosure behavior following a change in private litigation risk. We use an alternative matching procedure for the US control firms, where we match based on the level of the dependent variable in the pre-period conditional on year and industry. We select the firm with the closest propensity score in case of multiple matches. We report OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. We include industry-and country-fixed effects in the regression, but do not report the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). The table reports additional sensitivity analyses of our base specifications (see Table 4 ) examining changes in firms' voluntary disclosure behavior following a change in private litigation risk. In Panel A, we include only Canadian-US firm pairs. In Panel B, we exclude Canadian-US firm pairs. The panels only report the OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics of the main variables of interest, but include the full set of controls and fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). The table reports changes in firms' voluntary disclosure behavior following a change in private litigation risk using market-based measures as proxies for voluntary disclosure. We use the following four market-based dependent variables: (1) Absolute Size Adjusted Returns is the absolute value the three-day raw return minus the return of the corresponding size-decile index centered at the dates of the quarterly earnings announcement ("QEA"). (2) Share Turnover is the three-day average of the ratio of shares traded to total shares outstanding around QEA. (3) Bid-Ask Spread is the three-day average of the difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point of the bid and ask price around QEA, multiplied by 100. All other variables are defined in Tables 2 and 4 . We exclude foreign-US firm pairs where Foreign Trading is above 90% to ensure sufficient US trading. We report OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. We include industry-and country-fixed effects in the regression, but do not report the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed).
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